A Critique of the Premises of Reification: Hiromatsu Wataru's De-Reification Strategy in the Horizon of Kant

Abstract

This paper argues that while Kant's Transcendental Deduction establishes the objective validity of the categories by linking givenness to the unity of apperception and to schematized synthesis, it inadvertently leaves a premise-level opening for reification: relations and rule-effects can be misinterpreted as properties of self-subsisting entities. Drawing on Hiromatsu Wataru's concepts of intersubjectivity and the "fourfold structure," a de-reifying account of objecthood is reconstructed that emphasizes the primacy of relations by locating objectivity in appearing mechanisms that are operational, testable, and re-identifiable. The paper first diagnoses the pressure exerted by givenness, unity, and objectivity in Kant's A/B-Deduction and examines the "colored glasses" motif. It then develops a formal grammar (p as [p] for P as [P]) to demonstrate how koto replaces mono as the unit of analysis. Finally, it provides a critical assessment of the risks of idealism and circularity, addresses the question of "hardness" without underlying substrates, and considers unity without transcendental apperception, advocating methodological reinforcements through standards, calibration, and interoperation.