Article

The Evolution of the European Union's Securitization of Climate Change and the Effectiveness of Its Policies

Siyu Chen [1,*]

[1] School of International Studies, The University of Nottingham, Ningbo, China

* Correspondence: Siyu Chen, School of International Studies, The University of Nottingham, Ningbo, China

Abstract: As climate change intensifies as a pressing global concern, its securitization has become a pivotal issue in international governance. The European Union (EU), recognizing the escalating risks, has increasingly incorporated climate change into its security agenda, framing it as a non-traditional security threat. This paper explores the EU's securitization process through the framework of the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory, examining its internal and external climate policies across discursive, institutional, and practical dimensions. Initially adopting a "rhetorical leadership" approach, the EU evolved towards "leadership-by-example" and, more recently, has assumed the role of a "leadiator", promoting global cooperation on climate initiatives. The paper evaluates the effectiveness of major EU policies, including emissions reduction commitments and the advancement of renewable energy, while also addressing persistent challenges such as internal policy fragmentation and external geopolitical pressures. The study concludes that although the EU's securitization of climate change has notably shaped global climate governance, significant obstacles remain in fostering deeper international collaboration and resolving internal inconsistencies.

Keywords: climate change; securitization; European Union (EU); climate diplomacy; emissions reduction

1. Introduction

As climate change continues to intensify, it has become a critical political issue on the international stage and a new arena for global actors to assert influence and amplify their voices. Climate change has emerged as a major topic of debate in prominent international forums such as the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council, and the G8/G20 [1]. Extreme weather events, triggered by climate change, directly affect social production and citizens' daily lives worldwide, heightening public awareness across different social groups. Nearly 80% of Europeans regard climate change as a severe problem. As a supranational entity and a key player in global governance, the European Union (EU) has addressed climate change and played a central role in its securitization — from initially adopting "rhetorical leadership" to "leadership-by-example" and now to the more integrative role of "leadiator" (a combination of leading by example and facilitating mediation) [2,3]. The EU continues to drive innovation on climate change by advancing legislation, setting emission targets, and aligning energy, economic recovery, and environmental protection policies with climate objectives. As an emerging force in non-traditional security, the EU has gradually included climate change in its security agenda, shaping a novel model for climate governance to address the security risks posed by climate change and increase its influence in international security matters.

This paper will apply the analytical framework of the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory to explore the EU's securitization process regarding climate change. It will examine the effectiveness of the EU's climate policies and the challenges it faces, considering both internal and external perspectives across discourse, institutional, and practical levels.

The paper is divided into three parts. The first section outlines the evolving role of the EU in the securitization of climate change within the context of global governance. The second section analyzes the EU's internal and external securitization policies from the discursive, institutional, and practical dimensions, using the Copenhagen School's theoretical framework. The third section evaluates the effectiveness and challenges of the EU's climate change securitization process. This research holds both theoretical and practical significance. Theoretically, it contributes a case study for the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory, deepening understanding of how the EU has integrated climate change into its security agenda and assessing the effectiveness of its climate governance model. Practically, it highlights the success of the EU's climate change securitization and provides policy insights for other countries and regions to tackle the international security challenges posed by climate change. It also offers theoretical support and practical pathways for advancing global climate governance cooperation and coordination.

2. Literature Review

Following the end of the Cold War, the scope and subjects of security studies have significantly broadened. In the context of the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory, researchers have contributed to the development of this theory. In 1990, Buzan and Wæver co-authored The European Security Order Recast, which marked the formal emergence of the "Copenhagen School". Ole Wæver introduced the concept of the "Speech Act" in his manuscript Security, the Speech Act. A successful "speech act" combines language and societal context, adheres to security institutions, follows grammatical rules, and integrates terminology from various domains. It is through this process that an "existential threat" is framed, offering a potential resolution to a crisis [4,5].

In contrast to traditional security studies, which primarily view threats in military terms and focus on state sovereignty, the Copenhagen School centers social relations in security analysis. From a constructivist perspective, the theory provides a foundational framework for understanding how issues are constructed as security threats through the use of "speech acts". Securitization, as defined by the theory, refers to "the active process of invoking security and initiating policies and actions based on framing issues as threats". A securitizing speech act serves to elevate certain political issues, creating a sense of urgency that convinces the audience of the necessity of extraordinary measures.

In 1998, researchers analyzed the dynamics of securitization within the environmental sector and identified its unique characteristics in Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Their work had a profound impact on both political and academic circles, broadening the scope of the security agenda. Climate change, being a core environmental issue, was central to this discourse. In 2006, Foreign Secretary Margaret Kamphof delivered the Berlin Lecture on "Climate and Security", introducing the term "climate security" for the first time. She emphasized that "climate change is not an alternative security agenda", thus elevating the discussion of climate security to a new level [6].

Proedrou argues that the first step in securitizing climate change is the "securitizing move", which involves introducing climate security into international policy discussions and framing it as a threat to human, national, and international security [7].

Simultaneously, there has been significant scholarly debate regarding the European Union's normative role in securitizing climate change. Oberthür and Bauerle highlighted the EU's leadership in climate governance, pointing out that it derives not only from political and economic influence but also from soft power resources, such as diplomatic leadership, persuasion, and exemplifying leadership [8]. Oberthür and Dupont introduced a framework for evaluating the EU's international climate leadership, incorporating both exemplary and diplomatic leadership, and offering a comprehensive analysis of the EU's role in global climate governance [2].

3. Historical Process of Securitization of Climate Change Issues in the EU

3.1. Environmental Security and the Securitization of Climate Change Issues

Since the 1970s, environmental issues have increasingly been incorporated into political agendas. By the 1980s, the growing significance of global environmental challenges prompted international discussions on "environmental security". In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development introduced the concept of "environmental security" in Our Common Future, highlighting the close connection between environmental and security issues. It became widely accepted that environmental degradation threatens the achievement of all other human values. Mische argues that integrating environmental concerns into security thinking helps to better balance societal values related to the environment with other core values. This balance is essential not only for protecting ecosystems but also for ensuring the long-term realization of other human goals, such as economic growth and social stability [9].

Climate change, as a central issue of environmental security, represents a non-traditional security threat. It impacts resource availability, directly and indirectly, by influencing material foundations and social factors, thus triggering typical security challenges. For instance, rising sea levels place small island nations at risk of disappearing, while also exacerbating international and regional crises, such as ethnic conflicts, resource disputes, and food shortages. According to Melchiorre, the security impacts of climate change are unevenly distributed, disproportionately threatening the most vulnerable populations around the world [10].

In the complex landscape of global governance, the issue of climate change has evolved from a scientific inquiry into human-induced factors to a securitized political issue [2]. During this period, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established to assess the scientific, technological, and socio-economic impacts of climate change. Simultaneously, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was introduced as a framework for international cooperation, along with the Šekarić Stojanović, aimed at addressing climate challenges [11].

The significance of climate change impacts on ecosystems and human societies was highlighted in the Third IPCC Assessment Report in 2001. The Fourth IPCC Assessment Report, published in 2007, underscored the threats posed by climate change, the economic costs of inaction, and provided further scientific evidence of global warming, while proposing strategies to cope with its impacts. At the same time, global leaders increasingly portrayed climate change as a threat to survival, driving a worldwide movement to elevate climate change to a matter of high-security politics.

3.2. The Changing Role of the EU in the Development of Securitization of Climate Change Issues

The EU's climate change securitization agenda can be divided into three phases, based on evolving policy priorities and key outcomes.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the EU adopted a "rhetorical leadership" approach. During this time, climate change was primarily viewed as an environmental issue to be addressed through traditional policy measures, rather than as a security threat. The European Commission largely followed the climate change policies set by the European Council. However, as global attention to climate change grew, the European Council began using securitization language, framing climate change as a significant issue. By 1995, the EU shifted from describing climate change as a "risk" to highlighting its potential for severe societal damage and stressing the urgency of action. In 1999, the EU reaffirmed that climate change was "one of the major global environmental challenges". Despite this rhetoric, internal EU policies on energy efficiency, renewable energy, and voluntary emissions reduction agreements with car manufacturers largely failed to meet expectations [2,12,13]. The EU also played a key role in advancing the Ruiz-Campillo, pushing for legally binding emission reduction commitments, and advocating for increased reductions from

member states, such as the proposed 15% cut in emissions, marking its active role in international climate negotiations [14].

From 2000 to 2008, the EU furthered the securitization of climate change, shifting towards a "leadership-by-example" approach [2]. A pivotal moment came with the U.S. decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which catalyzed an intensified debate on the security implications of climate change within the EU and internationally. The European Jayaram recognized the security risks posed by climate change, and in 2008, the European Commission referred to climate change as a "threat multiplier" [15]. During this period, the EU implemented several key policies, including the promotion of renewable energy (Directive 2001/77/EC), energy efficiency in buildings (Directive 2002/91/EC), and the establishment of a greenhouse gas emissions trading system (Directive 2003/87/EC). Additionally, the EU pushed for the enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol, which became a cornerstone of its climate policy, further solidifying its role in the securitization of climate change [16].

After 2008, the EU emerged as a "leadiator" in the international community, combining leadership-by-example with a mediating role [3]. In January of that year, the European Commission proposed enhancing renewable energy policies, reforming the emissions trading scheme (ETS), sharing emission reduction efforts across various sectors, and supporting the development of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies. Additionally, the EU set ambitious climate targets, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels, and aiming for carbon neutrality by 2050. These targets not only reinforce the EU's "leadership-by-example" on climate change but also signal globally that collective action to combat climate change is both achievable and economically viable [17,18].

On the international stage, the EU has continued to encourage other nations to take action through bilateral negotiations and climate diplomacy, positioning itself as a bridge between developed and developing countries in climate governance. Despite the U.S. announcement to withdraw from the Paris Agreement in 2017, the EU has maintained its climate leadership and has urged other nations to follow its example.

4. Policy Analysis of the Eu's Security of Climate Change Issues

This paper examines the evolution of the EU's climate change securitization policy from both internal and external perspectives, focusing on discourse, practices, and institutional dynamics. The internal perspective looks at EU citizens, organizations, and member states, while the external perspective considers the international community (various countries). The EU's internal policies and actions shape the willingness of external actors to respond, while its interactions with the international community influence how its internal audience perceives its credibility. These two perspectives are interconnected, creating a feedback loop that drives ongoing policy development.

4.1. Internal Perspective

McDonald highlighted the unique supranational nature of the European Community, noting that its strength lay more in economic power than military force [19]. He argued that the European Community sought to "domesticate" international relations by applying principles of shared responsibility and contractual politics traditionally reserved for domestic affairs. In the field of climate governance, the EU has adopted this approach internally, aiming to tackle global climate change through collective responsibility.

The 2008 report Climate Change and International Security first described climate change as a "threat multiplier". This concept was later emphasized in Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, which underlined how climate change exacerbates issues such as food insecurity, migration, and regional instability, identifying it as one of the five key priorities in the EU Security Strategy. The European Green Deal (EGD) of 2019 further

elevated climate change as an unprecedented priority, describing it as both a "threat multiplier" and a major source of instability, with the ambitious goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050. In 2022, the Council of the EU adopted the Strategic Compass, turning these visions into concrete action programs. The document frequently references climate change's role as a "threat multiplier" and outlines recommendations for the defense sector, including enhancing energy and resource efficiency and adapting the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) to climate-related challenges [20].

At the institutional and practical levels, the EU played a key role in promoting the Ahmad, the world's first binding international agreement focused on greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions [21]. Under the protocol, the EU committed to cutting GHG emissions by 8% between 2008 and 2012 compared to 1990 levels — the highest reduction target among industrialized nations (European Commission, n.d.). To meet this commitment, the EU developed internal climate governance structures, including the Burden Sharing Agreement (BSA), which allocated emission reduction targets among member states based on factors such as economic development, population, and energy consumption.

The EU also pioneered the creation of the Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), its flagship climate policy tool. The ETS has evolved across four phases. The first phase (2005-2007) was a "learning by doing" period, laying the groundwork for stricter measures. The second phase (2008-2012), aligned with the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period, saw the EU-15 achieve an overall domestic emissions reduction of 11.7%. The third phase (2013-2020) introduced an EU-wide emissions cap, shifted the main allocation method from free permits to auctioning, broadened sector and gas coverage, and established the NER 300 fund to support innovative renewable energy and carbon capture projects (European Commission, n.d.). The fourth phase (2021-2030) continues to build on these foundations with more ambitious targets and reforms [22].

Furthermore, promoting the energy transition has become an inevitable path for all countries aiming to advance climate governance and achieve carbon neutrality. In 2007, the EU began integrating climate and energy policies through the 2020 Climate and Energy Package, setting the "three 20%" targets for 2020: a 20% reduction in total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions compared to 1990 levels, a 20% improvement in energy efficiency, and a 20% share of renewable energy in final energy consumption.

Building on this foundation, the 2030 Climate and Energy Framework adopted in 2014 raised the ambition by setting goals of a 40% reduction in GHG emissions, a renewable energy share of at least 27%, and a 27% improvement in energy efficiency by 2030. To further accelerate the transition to clean energy, the EU adopted a revised Renewable Energy Directive in 2023, raising the renewable energy share target to 42.5% by 2030, with Member States encouraged to collectively strive for a 45% share (European Commission, n.d.).

To ensure a fair and inclusive transition towards its 2050 climate neutrality goal, the EU introduced the Just Transition Mechanism. This mechanism provides additional financial assistance to member states and regions that are highly dependent on fossil fuels or have carbon-intensive industries, aiming to mitigate the socio-economic impacts of the energy transition and promote equitable sharing of its benefits [23]. These initiatives underline the EU's strategic efforts to lead global climate action while maintaining internal cohesion and fairness across its member states.

4.2. External Perspective

At the international level, the EU plays a pivotal role in United Nations climate change negotiations and broader global efforts to combat climate change. It engages in climate- and energy-related investment activities through international cooperation, actively promotes its climate governance norms abroad, and seeks to consolidate international support. In multilateral climate negotiations, the EU has demonstrated the capacity

to "speak with one voice", allowing it to assert a dominant influence and secure outcomes aligned with its interests [24].

Consistently, the EU has framed climate change as a "threat multiplier", emphasizing its potential to exacerbate migration crises, food insecurity, and water conflicts, and has urged the international community to respond with urgency. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, has stressed that global cooperation to tackle climate change is critical not only for environmental preservation but also for the maintenance of global peace and security (European Commission). Similarly, Charles Michel, then President of the European Council, asserted in 2020 that "climate neutrality is no longer a matter of choice; it is unquestionably a necessity." [25].

At the institutional and operational level, the Council of the European Union established the EU Coordination and Representation System in the 1990s [26]. This mechanism was designed to coordinate common positions prior to international negotiations and present harmonized, coherent messages externally. Its flexibility has enabled the EU to respond effectively to the evolving climate agenda while strengthening internal solidarity during negotiations. Furthermore, with the launch of the European Green Deal in December 2019, the EU committed to achieving climate neutrality by 2050, accompanied by revisions to economic, energy, and industrial support policies, including outreach to neighboring regions.

The adoption of the European Climate Law in June 2021 provided a binding legal framework to achieve this target, reinforcing the EU's leadership credentials in global climate governance. More recently, the adoption of the Fit for 55 legislative package in 2023 detailed measures necessary to meet the EU's interim objective of a 55% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030, ensuring legal and policy coherence in pursuit of full climate neutrality by 2050 [27,28]. These initiatives collectively bolster the EU's credibility and influence within international climate forums.

The European Green Deal has closely linked climate action with national security imperatives and intertwined the post-pandemic economic recovery with green transformation, thereby ushering EU climate policy into a more comprehensive, strategic, and securitized new phase. In parallel, the EU has actively exported its climate governance model through extensive climate and energy-related investment initiatives.

According to the Council's publication of the 2023 international climate finance figures, the EU provided a total of €35.8 billion to support efforts aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and promoting climate adaptation in developing countries, with approximately 50% allocated to adaptation or cross-cutting actions. These efforts not only assist developing countries in implementing the goals of the 2015 Paris Agreement, thereby integrating them into the broader framework of international climate action, but also reinforce the EU's position as a normative leader in global climate governance. Furthermore, the 2023 figures reaffirm the EU and its member states' commitment to meeting international climate finance obligations, particularly the collective target for developed countries to mobilize USD 100 billion annually, a commitment set to remain in effect through 2025 [29].

Simultaneously, the European Commission is advancing initiatives to promote the establishment of a global carbon trading system modeled on the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), utilizing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. This effort aims to extend the EU's influence over the global carbon market architecture and enhance its bargaining power in international climate negotiations.

Throughout the securitization process of climate change within the EU, the recursive interplay between internal and external dynamics has become increasingly evident. The implementation of ambitious internal emission reduction targets and concrete policy actions has strengthened the EU's credibility and leadership in international negotiations. In turn, external feedback and international cooperation have reinforced domestic support for the EU's climate agenda, contributing to the long-term resilience and sustainability of its climate policies.

4.3. Assessment of the Effectiveness of the EU's Climate Change Security and Future Challenges

In terms of overall effectiveness, the EU's securitization of climate change has been largely successful, fostering internal consensus among member states while enhancing its recognition and influence externally. Nevertheless, climate change remains a long-term, complex challenge, and the EU's securitization strategy reflects this enduring temporal dimension. Internally, the securitization process has driven progress toward achieving emission reduction targets and decoupling economic growth from energy consumption, generating positive spillover effects in the upgrading of the EU's energy structure and promoting sustainable economic development. However, looking ahead, divergences in climate ambition and capabilities among EU member states may pose challenges to the deepening of collective climate governance.

Externally, the EU's securitization discourse has elevated the perceived importance and urgency of climate change globally, influencing both the climate security concepts and policy frameworks of other states and international organizations. Guided by the Paris Agreement, the EU continues to transform itself into a low-carbon, resource-efficient, and competitive economy, while emphasizing the principle of inclusivity — ensuring that "No person and no place is left behind." The European Green Deal offers a comprehensive strategic framework for achieving these objectives, positioning Europe to become the world's first climate-neutral continent by 2050.

The EU's pursuit of a fair, green, efficient, and sustainable transition has not only served as a global exemplar but has also driven continuous innovation in its internal climate policies. According to the most recent joint submission by Spain and the European Commission on behalf of the EU and its Amanfo, the EU has demonstrated tangible progress in securitizing climate change, thereby reinforcing its global leadership and internal governance [30]. At the international level, the EU has updated its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to commit to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030, with the overarching goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050. Furthermore, in February 2024, the European Commission proposed an intermediate target of a 90% emissions reduction by 2040, providing greater clarity for the EU's long-term climate strategy.

Meanwhile, instruments such as the Social Climate Fund have been deployed to mitigate transitional impacts, particularly in supporting vulnerable populations and ensuring a just transition among member states. By placing citizens at the core of its climate transformation efforts, the EU has not only strengthened the societal resilience to climate change but also contributed a practical model for global climate governance [31].

Despite the establishment of a relatively comprehensive climate governance framework, the EU continues to face multiple challenges in the process of securitizing climate change. Notably, during the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference, the EU's climate diplomacy encountered significant setbacks [32]. Its ambitious emissions reduction targets and financial support pledges failed to garner sufficient international backing, ultimately leading to the conference's inability to conclude a legally binding global emissions reduction agreement.

Within the EU itself, divergences among member states further complicate the implementation of climate policy. Countries such as Poland and Hungary, with heavy reliance on coal, have expressed reservations regarding stringent emissions reduction measures, posing obstacles to the realization of the EU's climate neutrality objectives. Differences in approaches to low-carbon energy transitions and divergent attitudes towards natural gas imports from Russia have also exposed inconsistencies in internal energy strategies, creating both internal tensions and external vulnerabilities.

Meanwhile, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), although a central tool for emissions reduction, has faced issues such as carbon price volatility and market imbalances, undermining its effectiveness. Concerns over carbon leakage have further prompted the EU to propose the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which,

while aiming to protect EU industries, risks eliciting opposition from international trade partners.

These challenges invite deeper reflection on the limits of the EU's securitization efforts regarding climate change. Scholars such as Conca and Kuzemko argue that audience rejection of securitization initiatives contributed to policy difficulties, while Hilali suggests that, although securitization efforts were partly successful, the concurrent global economic crisis diminished the perceived urgency for adopting unconventional measures [33-35]. Furthermore, discrepancies between the securitization actors' framing of climate risks and the perceptions of audience groups — who are influenced by subjective experiences and external pressures — have complicated the securitization process [36].

Nevertheless, in the long run, the framing of climate change as a security threat remains a central pillar of EU policy [37]. Despite the challenges, the EU's securitization efforts have contributed to raising international awareness of the urgency of climate change and have, to a certain extent, advanced the global climate governance agenda [38].

5. Conclusion

In the context of an increasingly complex international landscape, discussions around climate security have predominantly centered on developed countries. However, for many developing nations, climate change remains primarily a development challenge. The securitization of development issues risks diluting developed countries' historical responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions, undermining the developmental interests of the Global South, and potentially increasing the risk of legitimizing external interventions. Thus, whether applying a securitization framework is the most appropriate approach to addressing climate change merits deeper reflection and critical discussion.

"Fighting climate change is imperative for the future of the world." As a pioneer in global climate governance, the European Union has played a leading role by advancing climate legislation, setting ambitious emissions reduction targets, and integrating energy, economic recovery, and environmental protection initiatives with its climate goals. The EU's experience demonstrates how a regional actor can enhance its autonomy, political will, negotiation capacity, and institutional capabilities to establish itself as a prominent player in international climate governance. By consolidating political and social consensus around climate issues, promoting European integration, and gradually developing a comprehensive climate policy framework, the EU has provided a valuable and replicable model for global climate governance.

Through a geopolitical lens, this study not only offers a theoretical perspective for understanding how climate change has been elevated to a security concern but also proposes practical pathways for enhancing global cooperation and coordination in climate governance. By analyzing the EU's transformation into a global climate actor and evaluating the effectiveness of its securitization efforts, this paper highlights that securitizing climate change is a highly complex process. It requires policymakers to balance security imperatives with socio-economic considerations, while effectively mobilizing and coordinating actors across multiple levels to tackle this unprecedented global challenge.

References

1. S. Rutigliano, "The Decisive Link Between Sustainability and Security: Mandate, Scope and Purpose," in *EU External Relations Law and Sustainability: The EU, Third States and International Organizations*, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2025, pp. 91-110, doi: 10.1007/978-94-6265-655-0_5.
2. C. Dupont, J. Rosamond, and B. L. Zaki, "Investigating the scientific knowledge–policy interface in EU climate policy," *Policy Polit.*, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 88-107, 2024, doi: 10.1332/030557321X16861511996074.
3. L. Wirthová, "Environmentally driven migration in EU discourse: norms, policies and realities," *UCL Open Environ.*, vol. 6, e1975, 2024, doi: 10.14324/111.444/ucloe.1975.
4. G. Fifi and X. Gao, "From the green to the just transition: the emergence of the Compensatory State in the EU's approach to climate change," *JCMS: J. Common Market Stud.*, 2025, doi: 10.1111/jcms.13736.

5.   F. Proedrou and M. Pournara, "A limited green criminological turn in the EU approach to climate change? Mapping representations of climate change as ecocide," *J. Eur. Integr.*, pp. 1-19, 2024, doi: 10.1080/07036337.2024.2440875.

6.   R. Kamphof, T. Bonenkamp, J. Selleslaghs, and M. O. Hosli, "External competences in energy and climate change," in *Res. Handb. EU Energy Law Policy*, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2024, pp. 33-50, doi: 10.4337/9781035328024.00009.

7.   F. Proedrou, "Anthropocene geopolitics and foreign policy: Exploring the link in the EU case," *Alternatives*, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 83-101, 2020, doi: 10.1177/0304375420931706.

8.   S. Bauerle Danzman and S. Meunier, "The EU's geoeconomic turn: from policy laggard to institutional innovator," *JCMS: J. Common Market Stud.*, vol. 62, no. 4, pp. 1097-1115, 2024, doi: 10.1111/jcms.13599.

9.   A. Herranz-Surralles, "The EU energy transition in a geopoliticizing world," *Geopolitics*, vol. 29, no. 5, pp. 1882-1912, 2024, doi: 10.1080/14650045.2023.2283489.

10. T. Melchiorre, "The international and regional dimensions of the environmental actorness of the European Union," *J. Contemp. Eur. Stud.*, pp. 1-15, 2025, doi: 10.1080/14782804.2025.2472625.

11. N. Šekarić Stojanović and K. Zakić, "Renewable energy as a connecting spot between China and Central and Eastern European countries: status, directions and perspectives," *Energy Sustain. Soc.*, vol. 14, no. 1, p. 10, 2024, doi: 10.1186/s13705-024-00439-2.

12. J. Dreyer, "The Power of Victimhood: A Relational Analysis of the Diplomatic Negotiations on a UN Loss and Damage Fund," *Millennium*, 2025, doi: 10.1177/03058298251318780.

13. T. Gamkrelidze, "Understanding EU's securitization of the neighborhood: frame alignment and projection on partner countries," *Eur. Polit. Soc.*, pp. 1-26, 2024, doi: 10.1080/23745118.2024.2421900.

14. X. Ruiz-Campillo and C. del Río, "Make room for me! A study of how climate change and environment landed on Spanish national security," *Eur. Secur.*, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 44-62, 2024, doi: 10.1080/09662839.2023.2213164.

15. D. Jayaram and A. Vogler, "Climate Change and the Military: Discourses and Practices," in *Oxford Res. Encycl. Int. Stud.*, 2025, doi: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.890.

16. T. M. Wik and A. W. Neal, "The prioritisation of climate security: A content analysis of national security agendas," *Environ. Secur.*, 2024, doi: 10.1177/27538796241257554.

17. S. K. Panda, "Challenges and opportunities for European energy policy and sustainable transformations in the aftermath of Russia's military intervention in Ukraine," *Environ. Dev. Sustain.*, pp. 1-22, 2024, doi: 10.1007/s10668-024-04863-4.

18. G. A. Deirmentzoglou, E. E. Anastasopoulou, and P. Sklias, "International economic relations and energy security in the European Union: a systematic literature review," *Int. J. Sustain. Energy*, vol. 43, no. 1, p. 2385682, 2024, doi: 10.1080/14786451.2024.2385682.

19. M. McDonald, "Climate change, security and the institutional prospects for ecological security," *Geoforum*, vol. 155, p. 104096, 2024, doi: 10.1016/j.geoforum.2024.104096.

20. J. Pollak and S. R. Schubert, "Squaring the Circle? The EU's Energy Dilemma," in *The European Union's Geopolitics: The Lackluster World Power*, Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2025, pp. 119-139. ISBN: 9783031745867.

21. Z. Ahmad, "Worlds Apart: The Fairness Dimension of Securitisation Narratives in the Climate Change and Foreign Investment Context," 2025, doi: 10.1007/8165_2024_131.

22. E. Post and P. Le Billon, "The 'green war': Geopolitical metabolism and green extractivisms," *Geopolitics*, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 760-800, 2025, doi: 10.1080/14650045.2024.2385411.

23. T. Meyer, "Mapping energy geopolitics in Europe: journalistic cartography and energy securitisation After the Russian invasion of Ukraine," *Geopolitics*, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 432-464, 2025, doi: 10.1080/14650045.2024.2362668.

24. F. von Malmborg, "Tapping the conversation on the meaning of decarbonization: Discourses and discursive agency in EU politics on low-carbon fuels for maritime shipping," *Sustainability*, vol. 16, no. 13, p. 5589, 2024, doi: 10.3390/su16135589.

25. S. Kalantzakos, "China as partner? Tackling climate and energy challenges," in *The Transatlantic Community and China in the Age of Disruption*, Routledge, 2024, pp. 178-194. ISBN: 9781003273936.

26. Z. Dubský, M. Votoupalová, and A. Vítková, "Framing the European Green Deal: political and media energy discourses in Czechia and Sweden," *Humanit. Soc. Sci. Commun.*, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 1-13, 2025, doi: 10.1057/s41599-025-04557-w.

27. M. McDonald, "Accepting responsibility? Institutions and the security implications of climate change," *Secur. Dialogue*, vol. 55, no. 3, pp. 293-310, 2024, doi: 10.1177/09670106231212149.

28. H. G. Brauch, "The Anthropocene and International Political Order: Towards an Integrated Analysis," in *Towards Rethinking Politics, Policy and Polity in the Anthropocene: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2025, pp. 89-157, doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-71807-6_2.

29. M. Salman, G. Wang, L. Qin, and X. He, "G20 roadmap for carbon neutrality: The role of Paris agreement, artificial intelligence, and energy transition in changing geopolitical landscape," *J. Environ. Manag.*, vol. 367, p. 122080, 2024, doi: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2024.122080.

30. S. E. Amanfo and J. J. Puthenkalam, "Perspective Chapter: The Regime Matters–A Multidisciplinary Perspective on Energy Security in the Era of Climate Change and Growing Uncertainties for Resilience in Sustainable Energy Development," in *Power Quality and Harmonics Management in Modern Power Systems*, IntechOpen, 2024, doi: 10.5772/intechopen.1003092.

31. T. Jerzyniak, "The EU De-Risking of Energy Dependencies: Towards a New Clean Energy Geopolitical Order?," *Politics Govern.*, vol. 12, 2024, doi: 10.17645/pag.8285.

32. W. He, Z. Liu, and R. Zhang, "Energy transitions in Europe since 2022: A case study of France and Germany," in *Connecting Ideas, Cultures, and Communities*, Routledge, 2025, pp. 412-422. ISBN: 9781003591511.

33. K. Conca and G. D. Dabelko, "The international (in) security order and the climate-conflict-security nexus," *Environ. Secur.*, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 501-524, 2024, doi: 10.1177/27538796241287358.

34. C. Kuzemko, M. Blondeel, M. Bradshaw, G. Bridge, E. Faigen, and L. Fletcher, "Rethinking energy geopolitics: Towards a geo-political economy of global energy transformation," *Geopolitics*, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 531-565, 2025, doi: 10.1080/14650045.2024.2351075.

35. I. Hilali, E. Dogan, Y. Altin, A. Servi, and Y. Isiker, "The geostrategic and economic impact of Türkiye's hydrogen energy vision on Europe," *Int. J. Hydrog. Energy*, vol. 57, pp. 100-106, 2024, doi: 10.1016/j.ijhydene.2024.01.002.

36. A. Nazareth, D. Kim, and Z. Shawoo, "External power dynamics and international climate governance in a crises-constrained world," *Clim. Dev.*, vol. 16, no. 10, pp. 881-891, 2024, doi: 10.1080/17565529.2024.2330984.

37. Y. Kurnyshova, "Chains of insecurities: constructing Ukraine's agency in times of war," *Policy Stud.*, vol. 45, no. 3-4, pp. 423-442, 2024, doi: 10.1080/01442872.2024.2325052.

38. M. Trbojević, D. Jovanović, and D. Đurđević, "Security policies and sustainable development in the Western Balkan region beyond 2022: current status, challenges, and prospects," *Energy Sustain. Soc.*, vol. 14, no. 1, p. 55, 2024, doi: 10.1186/s13705-024-00486-9.